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Abstract 
Using data for 459 US.Manufacturing industries over the period 1958-2005, this paper 
examines both the relationship between Globalization, relative wages and relative 
employment of non-production workers and the relationship between Globalization and the 
change in the structure of employment within the US. Manufacturing. We find that if the 
wage and employment gaps were separately increased by Globalization through outsourcing 
strategies, total inequalities between workers tended to decrease thanks to outsourcing 
strategies. Our results are partly in contradiction with those found by Feenstra and Hanson 
(2003). The second result of the paper is the change in the structure of employment over the 
period 1958-2005 where two distinct effects could be observed: a quantitative and a 
qualitative effect. Everything else equal, through outsourcing strategies, total employment in 
the US. Manufacturing increased by 0.040 percentage point and the non-production share in 
total employment increased by 0.033 percentage point. 
 
JEL classification: F14; F16; J31 
Keywords: Globalization, Outsourcing, relative wages, relative employment, Inequalities 
 
I. Introduction 
As concerns International Economics, there exists a literature on both theoretical and 
empirical, which attempts to show what impact international trade has on employment and 
wages in developed and developing countries. 
In 2009, Eurobarometer carried out a survey “Views on European Union enlargement.” This 
survey presents the point of view of Europeans about the consequence of enlargement job 
losses. The result is that 56% of Europeans think that enlargement has led to job losses. The 
result is even higher in the countries of central Europe with 58%. (Figure 1) 
Indeed, Globalization can explain an increase in wage inequality because it increases 
competition from low-wage countries with developed countries industries (Feenstra and 
Hanson 1996) 
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It is interesting to recall some stylized facts about the rise in wage inequality between skilled 
and unskilled workers. 
 First of all, we have been able to observe wage inequalities increased in the Northern 
countries since the mid-80s (Figure 2). If we look at the unemployment rate by occupation 
between 1988 until 2010 in the US, we can see that blue collar (unskilled workers) is 
relatively more affected by unemployment than white collar (skilled workers). In 1988, 8% of 
blue collar workers were unemployed and 3% for white-collar and in 2010, 12% of blue collar 
were unemployed against 5.8% for the white collar. (Figure 3). 
Empirical studies (Biscourp P. and F. Kramarz (2007)) show a growth in world trade with 
low-wage countries, especially in manufacturing.  
Besides, we can observe a growth of inequalities among skilled and unskilled workers.                  
These authors point out that there are good reasons to believe that trade liberalization harms 
unskilled workers.    
Indeed, there is an increase in trade with the South, which is manifested by an increase in 
imports of manufacturing goods from developed countries, as well as import of intermediate 
goods increase, adding to it a strong process deindustrialization in developed countries. From 
the 70s, the share of industrial value added in the United States declined. Indeed, the value 
added in percentage of GDP regarding the industries as a whole represented 25% in 1969 
whereas it  reached 14% in 2001, that is a decrease of 10 percentage points. We can observe 
the similar decrease over the same period as regards the manufacturing sector (figure 4).  
Moreover, we can see that in 2005 the United States mainly import manufactured goods from 
China. They spend a bit more than 5% of GDP in the import of manufactured goods from 
China whereas it was 2.5% in 1990. This was a sharp increase in the import of these goods. 
The second country is Mexico. Estimated imports of manufactured goods from Mexico 
towards the US were only 2.5% in 2005 whereas they reached 1.8% in 1990. The increase 
between 1990 and 2005 finds its explanation in the creation of NAFTA
1
. (North American 
Free Trade Agreement) in 1994. (US International Trade) (Figure 5) 
 
1The NAFTA is a free trade agreement signed in January 1994 by the United-States, Canada and Mexico.  
 This agreement aimed to reduce tariffs in order to facilitate trade among themselves 
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Robert C. Feenstra (2005) shows that wage inequalities between skilled and unskilled workers 
rose sharply from 1980 (figure 6). Moreover, we have seen above that the share of production 
of manufactured goods in total output tends to decrease in developed countries. This decrease 
is correlated with the increase in imports of goods from developing countries. Facts are 
consistent with the HO theory. That theorem tells “each country will export the good that uses 
its abundant factor intensively“.  
Therefore, it is expected that developed countries export capital-intensive goods and 
developing countries export labor-intensive goods causing wage inequality between skilled 
and unskilled workers. The theory shows that at constant prices, the industrial added value of 
developed countries has greatly diminished. This decline is still correlated to the fact that 
developed countries import industrial goods from developing countries. In theory, it is 
expected that the wages of unskilled workers will decrease and will raise regarding skilled 
workers in developed countries because the relative prices for industrial goods decreased                      
(Stolper-Samuelson theorem). Indeed, Stolper-Samuelson predicted an increase in wage 
inequality in the north, and fall in the south except we can observe an increase in inequality in 
the north and in the south.  
Goldberg and Pavcnik (Jel, 2001): they studied the impact of trade liberalization on inequality 
in several countries of the south (Mexico, Colombia.). All these countries have made reforms 
in the labor market; they have established skill premiums during the 80s and 90s. We have a 
return to education. For example, in Mexico the level of education increased by 68% between 
1987 and 1993 (Cragg and Epelbaum 1996) and by 16% in Columbia between 1986 and 1998 
(Attanasio and al 2004). Thereby, we have wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
workers. We realize the situation is tantamount to the one in the northern countries. 
 However, if the stylized facts suggest that globalization plays a role in the inequality of 
employment and wages, some economists suggest an exogenous factor:                          
technological change. (Verdier & Thoenig (2003), Acemoglu (2000)), Kluger & Verhoogen 
(2009). These authors show there is a biased technological change in favor of skilled workers 
because of trade openness. Indeed, technological change led to low-qualified jobs destruction 
but created more qualified jobs. For example: production worker versus the technician who 
comes and repairs a machine or Stenographers versus computer. 
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In relation to these facts, the research question of the paper is as follows: To what extent is 
globalization held responsible for wage and employment inequalities between skilled and 
unskilled workers in the U.S manufacturing industries from 1958 to 2005? 
The main limit of the current papers regarding that matter consists in never having wage and 
employment equations regressed simultaneously. Accordingly, one of our first contributions 
is to running simultaneously the outsourcing effect on relative wages and relative employment 
and thereby measuring the total inequalities as regards outsourcing effects upon relative 
wages and relative employment among workers. The second contribution consists in 
analyzing outsourcing during the 1958-2005 period in order to appreciate its effect on the                          
total inequalities. The last contribution corresponds to the “instrumental variables method” 
using. This consists in purging “the outsourcing variable” supposed to be endogenous. 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First off, we will simultaneously analyze the effects of 
outsourcing as regards relative wage and relative employment between skilled and unskilled 
workers. To do so, we will set up the following ratio: relative wage non-production to 
production workers which measures the gap regarding relative wages among workers. We 
will use the same method as concerns the employment: Relative employment of non-
production to production workers. We will use the panel dimension of our database, the 
estimation methods will be: a within estimator and the instrumental variables method. 
Secondly, we will try to identify two effects of outsourcing regarding the change in the 
structure of employment within the US. Manufacturing: a quantitative and qualitative effect. 
In this paper, the main results show us that (1) Outsourcing increases both the relative wage 
and employment inequalities between skilled and unskilled workers only when the equations 
are separately running (2) Outsourcing strategies have changed the structure of employment 
within the US. Manufacturing. 
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1.1. Outsourcing: what is this? 
Managerial theory and International trade theory both show a different approach as regards 
“outsourcing”. Indeed, according to Managerial theory outsourcing is focused on arbitration 
among the modes of organization (firm or market). The specificity of the asset is the essential 
element in the choice of governance structure (Williamson 1975). If the specificity of the 
asset is high the solution is integration vertical (make) so to avoid opportunism risks that the 
use of the market may represent and conversely if the specificity of the asset is low the 
advantage goes to the market due to economies of scale (do make do).                                                
As concerns international trade, outsourcing means “the international division of value 
chains” i.e. Intermediate goods are imported to produce a final good. We will favour that 
definition. 
 
1.2. Outsourcing: concrete examples 
The real world is full of examples of outsourcing strategies. The first example, Nike the 
famous American brand shoes owns 124 subcontractors plants in China in 2004 regarding 
only textile part. Allowing for equipment and apparel, Nike owns 900 subcontractors plants in 
fifty countries and thereby employs one million workers. 
Example 2: Dell, the first computer constructor in the world owns nine subcontractors plants 
in 2007, one is located in Limerick (Ireland). In 2008, a new plant was based in Lodz (Poland) 
(Crozet 2009) 
Example 3: The Barbie doll is the perfect vertical specialization example as long no 
component is from the same place. The hair comes from Japan; the assembly (legs, arms, suit) 
is made in China 
As regards the share of intermediate goods, we can observe that the share of intermediate 
goods in world trade represents 16% in 2002 whereas it was 14% in 1995 (Fontagné and al 
2004) (figure 7). Similarly, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) show both an increase in 
the share of imported inputs in total inputs in goods producing sectors U.S and in the share of 
imported inputs in Gross Output in goods producing sectors U.S between 1972 and 2012 
which implicitly suggest the development in outsourcing strategies firms.(figure 8). Finally, 
we can notice that computer and electronic products industries import more. The imports of 
these industries represent 1.2 percent of GDP between 1989 and 2006 (figure 9) 
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The examples listed up above show that the firms go abroad to get intermediary goods so to 
optimize the production and reduce the production costs. 
 
1.3. Literature Review 
Economic analyses suggest two steps. In the 90’s, the first empirical analysis on the               
Stolper-Samuelson theorem is inconclusive (There is a 20% consensus about the impact of 
international trade; the rest is due to technological change), the destruction of employment 
(less qualified) is explained by technological change that improves the effectiveness of certain 
jobs and by contrast destroyed some of them. By and large if technological change is accepted 
(by fate), the impact of globalization on job destruction is less easily accepted.                       
Krugman (1993) thought that globalization was not responsible for job cuts in the northern 
countries because the theory of comparative advantage is still valid. Similarly,                       
Feenstra and Hanson (2003) suggest three reasons why the trade seems to play a minor role in 
wage inequality for some economists. The first reason: Magnitude of trade. Indeed, trading 
flows between the United States and developing countries are too weak to generate major 
changes in the wage structure. Trade (export + import to GDP) ratio is not higher in 1970 
compared to the one during the First World War, 6.1% of GDP in 1914 and 4.1% in 1970.                           
The second reason: Change in the price of imports. For Lawrence and Slaughter (1994), if 
international trade is the main cause of the decline in the relative wages of unskilled workers, 
we should observe a decrease in the price of intensive goods in unskilled labor                        
(clothes prices / other goods prices). Leamer (1998) shows that prices for apparel fell in the 
70’s but remain stable in the 80’s. The last reason: change in the structure of employment 
across and within industries. According to Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), the trade is 
not the dominant explanation for the relative change in wages and employment of skilled 
workers because the movement of wages and employment is smaller regarding the industries 
among themselves to the within industries. But the change that occurs within industries may 
be reported to trade. 
In the 2000’s, the analysis goes further, seeking the profound effects of international trade on 
the job destruction: Outsourcing and increased competition associated with trade openness 
enable to explain the phenomenon observed. 
Indeed, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1998, and 2003) are the first to unveil the responsibility 
of trade about wage inequalities between skilled and unskilled workers. They show that 
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outsourcing activities of the firms have a positive and significant impact on skilled workers 
wages within the U.S manufacturing during the 1979-1990 period. According to their 
conclusion, outsourcing has a major role as well as the technological change in wage 
inequalities among workers. 
Krugman (2008) revisits his analysis about trade effects on wage inequalities between skilled 
and unskilled workers. Indeed, he shows that globalization through outsourcing has a negative 
impact much more important compared to the previous analyses because of the US 
manufacturing import goods from low wages countries. These goods are made with intensive 
techniques in unskilled labor. 
In 2009, Ebeinstein, Harrison and al, carried out a survey about offshoring American 
multinational firms. The main results showed that offshoring towards high wages countries 
was positively correlated with employment in the American multinational firms. On the 
contrary, offshoring towards low wages countries involved a decrease of employment level in 
the American multinational firms. 
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1.4. Outsourcing, wages and employment: A theoretical approach 
This part consists in analyzing the effects of a purely theoretical point of view of outsourcing 
on employment and wages in both the Northern countries and the Southern countries.                     
To do so, we recall the main results found by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) then we will 
discuss an extension of the model made by Grossman and Hansberg (2008). Finally, we 
explain our approach to empirically test the model. 
The model by Feenstra and Hanson puts into perspective the effects that may result in 
outsourcing both employment and wages. In other words, this model says “What is done and 
what is not done”. The model breaks down as follows: 
The authors assume that to produce a final good, we must perform a number of tasks where z 
denotes a continuum of inputs belonging between 0 and 1. We have two countries, abundant 
capital home country (North) and abundant labor foreign country (South)  
Moreover, we have unit costs c (w,q,r,z) as a function of z, there is the upward- sloping curve 
CC and c*(w*,q*,r*,z*)  represent unit costs for abroad  “C*C* curve”. Finally, ž represents 
the production-sharing between the two countries. 
 If the home country decides to produce a good, the part of the production requires intensive 
use of unskilled labor, the production cost for this part will be high in the home country than 
in the foreign country that is assumed to be a low-wage country. Therefore, the home country 
will outsource this part.  
We can observe several effects in both the domestic and foreign countries as a result of 
outsourcing: 
 
In the home country: 
      Demand for unskilled workers decreases and demand for skilled workers rises. 
      The wages of skilled workers increase and decrease for unskilled workers. 
      We do have a widening wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. 
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In the foreign country: 
      Demand for unskilled workers rises and demand for skilled workers decreases. 
      The wages of unskilled workers increase and decrease for skilled workers. 
      Wage inequality also increased in the country. 
 
We can observe wage inequalities increased in the two countries.  
                                                                                                                                                 
           (Source Feenstra and Hanson, 1996) 
 
The graph
2 
here
 
above summarizes the main assumption of the model. 
(1) Between 0 and ž, the foreign country produces intensive tasks in unskilled labor. 
(2) Between ž and 1 the home country maintains intensive tasks in skilled labor because the 
relative cost as regards skilled labor is relatively cheap in the home country. 
Moreover, if the home country decides to outsource a new part of the production, it means 
that the remaining tasks are made with highly skilled labor. (See graph below) 
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The tasks newly produced in low-wage country are more intensive in skilled labor. 
In the foreign country: 
 Demand for skilled workers rises and demand for unskilled workers decreases. 
 The wages of skilled workers increase and decrease for unskilled workers. 
 We do have widening wage inequalities between skilled and unskilled workers. 
 
 
 
 
The total effect of the model is as follows: 
 Due to increased outsourcing, the demand for skilled labor has increased in two countries 
as well as the wages of skilled workers. 
 We have an increase in wage inequalities in both countries.   
                _____________________________________________________ 
                        2 The two graphs are similar to the Dornbusch-Fisher-Samuelson model (1977)     
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This model contradicts the prediction of Stolper-Samuelson. Moreover, the work done by 
Feenstra and Hanson enabled to have an alternative to the model of outsourcing.  
 
In 2008, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg made a model that outlined other effects of 
offshoring. Main assumptions of the model are as follows: 
 
 
(3) Production can be divided into a continuum of tasks. (Only L-tasks can be outsourced in 
foreign country.) 
 
(4) We have two types of tasks: Routine tasks and non-Routine tasks knowing that non-
routine tasks are more easily relocated because these tasks require “little education” of 
workers. 
 
(5) two goods are produced: X and Y. 
 
(6) Perfect competition model. 
 
(7) Offshoring cost of task (i) for industry j is αljβtj(i) with βtj(i) >1 and t’j(i) >0, offshoring 
rises with i. 
 
The paper looks at the impact of globalization, globalization leads to a decrease in β. 
(8)      we assume that the wages of unskilled workers are lower in the foreign country: w >w* 
 
(9)      Outsourcing is a means to reduce production costs.  
 
(10) Firms use the outsourcing strategies when w >w*βtj(i) 
 
(11) In perfect competition: price ≤ cost 
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 The authors find   pj≤ waLJ(1-/) +w*aLJ ∫ βt(i)di + saHJ. 
Where waLJ(1-/) represents cost of L-tasks performed at home country, w*aLJ ∫ βt(i)di  is cost 
of outsourced L- tasks and saHJ is cost of non-tradable tasks. If it lowers the cost of relocation, 
it relocates more and the average cost of the task decreases. If the cost is down prices fall.  
The above equation shows that the authors have found several effects. To find these effects, 
they replace w= w*βtj(i) in the zero profit condition: pj ≤ waLJ Ω(/) + saHJ. Also, they look the 
domestic factor market (we suppose in this model that each industry completes a fraction (1-/) 
of L-tasks at home country, then (1-/)alxx + (1-/)alyy= L  alxx + alyy= L/(1-/). Thanks to a 
total differentiation of the system, we have the impact of a change in β on the wages of 
unskilled wokers. 
Ẇ= -Ω + µ1p - µ2dl/(1-/). Where -Ω is productivity effect. The cost saving due to relocation 
benefits to low-skilled workers. Firms become more efficient this is equivalent to an 
improvement of the labor productivity of unskilled workers. Demand for low skilled workers 
rises and pushes wages-up. µ1p is relative price effect. We have lower costs in the intensive 
sector unskilled labor which leads to a Stolper-Samuelson effect i.e. reduction of wages of 
unskilled workers and rise of wages for skilled workers. µ2dl/(1-/) is Labor-supply effect. 
Indeed, relocation hurts unskilled workers that will involve a negative pressure on the labor 
market leading to lower wages for unskilled workers. 
To conclude, the relocation of some tasks involves binding effects for unskilled workers such 
as: labor supply or relative price effect. Only the productivity effect can offset these negative 
effects. We can suppose that if the cost of relocation is reduced, this will benefit to both 
workers: skilled and unskilled workers. This may lead to an increase of unskilled wages 
through productivity effect in northern countries. However, the model does not tell us that 
some skilled jobs can be outsourced. Indeed, some skilled employment such as: programmer 
job can be easily offshored whereas the maintenance technician is harder for being 
relocatable. Thereby, the effects of globalization on employment and wages remain 
ambiguous. 
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II. Empirical methodology and Data  
This section presents the empirical strategy used to estimate simultaneously the effects of 
outsourcing regarding the relative wages and the relative employment gap among workers and 
the two effects as regards the change in the structure of employment related to outsourcing. 
2.1. Regression step by step 
In the first part of this paper, outsourcing effects have been simultaneously tested on the 
relative wages and the relative employment within the US. Manufacturing industries during 
the 1958-2005 period. The goal is to obtain a proxy of the total outsourcing effect in relative 
wages and relative employment regarding skilled and unskilled workers. In order to do it, 
we’ll run a step by step regression. We’ll start with regressing a wage and employment 
equation inspired by Feenstra and Hanson (2003). The  three equations are the following : 
2.1.1. Relative Wages equation 
In this subsection, we want to estimate the following equations relying on                                             
the US manufacturing industries data from 1958 to 2005. Two regressions were specified (1) 
with panel method and (2) with instrumental variables method. 
 
(1) Δ log Wit= β0 + β1 Δlog outsourcingit+  β2 Δ log Xit  + uit 
 
Where Δ log Wit denotes the differential between t and t-1of the relative wages
3 
of non-
production workers in industry i at time t, Δ log outsourcing represents the differential 
between t and t-1 of outsourcing in industry i at time t, Δ log Xit represents the variation 
between t and t-1 of the explanatory variables such as: the openness-rate, technological 
change, high technology share, tariffs…,  
 
 
_______________                                                                                                                                               
3 The Relative wage measures the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
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                                                                    _________                                                                                                                  
(2) Δ log Wit= β0 + β1 Δlog outsourcingit+ β2 Δ log Xit + uit 
 
            _________                                                                                                                 
Where outsourcing represents the candidate variables (the differential regarding 
energy cost, labor cost regarding unskilled workers and capital intensity) to purge the 
outsourcing variable supposed to be endogenous 
     
  2.1.2. Relative employment equation 
We will use the same method as concerns the employment: panel method and instrumental 
variables method 
 
(1’) Δ log Nit = β0 + β1 Δ log outsourcingit+ β2 Δlog  Xit+ uit 
 
  Where Δ log Nit denotes the differential between t and t-1 of the relative employment
4 
of 
non-production workers in industry i at time t, Δlog Xit represents the differential between t 
and t-1  of the explanatory variables such as: the openness-rate, technological change, high 
technology share, tariff 
                                                          ________                                                                                                                                          
(2’) Δ log Nit =   β0 + β1 Δ log outsourcing +β2 Δ log Xit + uit                                                                                                                                           
              ________                                                                                                                                            
Where outsourcingit represents the same candidate variables, Δ Xi represents all our 
explanatory variables such as: outsourcing, the openness-rate, technological change, high 
technology share, tariffs 
_______________                                                                                                                                            
4 the relative employment measures the employment gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers. 
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2.1.3. The last stage   
In this subsection, we estimate the equations of wages and employment simultaneously, 
thereby we can measure total inequalities regarding outsourcing effects on relative wages and 
relative employment among workers. The equation is the following: 
 
(1’’) Δ log Wit/Nit   =   β0 + β1Δ log outsourcingit + β2 Δ log Xit+ uit 
 
Where the dependent variable represents the differential between t and t-1 of the total 
outsourcing effect both on the relative wages and the relative employment of non-production 
workers in the industry i at time t, Δ log outsourcing represents the differential between t and 
t-1 of outsourcing in industry i at time t, Δlog Xit represents the differential between t and t-1 
of the explanatory variables such as:, the openness-rate, technological change, high 
technology share, tariffs…                        
                                                                   ________                                                                                                                                   
(2’’) Δ log Wit/Nit   =     β0 + β1 Δ log outsourcing it + β2 Δlog Xit + uit 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
             ________                                                                                                                                  
Where outsourcing represents the candidate variables (the differential as regards energy cost, 
labor cost regarding unskilled workers and capital intensity.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
2.2. Quantitative and qualitative effect 
The second part of the paper shows two effects of outsourcing as regards the structure of 
employment within the US Manufacturing industries during the 1958 - 2005 period.  This part 
is inspired by Ebeinstein, Harrison and al (2009) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).                       
Ebeinstein, Harrison and al show a positive correlation between offshoring American 
multinational firms and employment and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg found a labor supply 
effect as a result of outsourcing. 
 
2.2.1. Quantitative effect 
(3)  Δ log Employmentit= β0 + β1 Δ log outsourcing it +β1 Δlog Xit +uit 
 
Where Δ log employmentit represents the variation between t and t-1 of the total employment 
in industry i at time t, Δ log outsourcing represents the variation between t and t-1 of 
outsourcing in industry i at time t and Δlog Xit represents the variation between t and t-1 of 
the explanatory variables in industry i at time t such as:, the openness-rate, the relative wage 
gap, the relative employment gap  
 
2.2.2. Qualitative effect 
(4) Δ log(Non production workers/ employment)it= β0 + β1 Δ log outsourcing it+ β2 Δlog Xit 
+uit 
 
Where Δ log (Non production workers/ total employment)it  denotes the variation between t 
and t-1 of  non-production workers share in total employment in industry i at time t, Δ log  
outsourcing represents the variation between t and t-1 of outsourcing in industry i  at time t  
and Δ log Xit  represents the same explanatory variables presented in  the previous equation. 
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2.2.3. Verification of the qualitative effect 
 
(5) Δ log(Production workers/ total employment)it= β0 + β1 Δlog Xit +uit 
Where Δ log (production workers/ total employment)it  represents the variation  between t 
and t-1 of  the  production workers share in total employment in industry i at time t, Δlog Xit  
represents the variation between t and t-1  of  the outsourcing ,  wages gap  and employment 
gap variables in industry i at time t. 
 
 
2.3. Description and Construction of different variables (dependent, interest, control, 
instruments) 
These subsections present the construction of the different variables used in our empirical 
research. For instance, the construction of the dependent variables and the explanatory 
variables such as: outsourcing and high technology share is inspired by Feenstra and Hanson 
(2003) 
 
 2.3.1. The dependent variables  
Two methods are frequently used in literature so to approximate skilled and non-skilled job. 
Thereby, production workers are tantamount to non-skilled workers and non-production 
workers are considered as skilled workers. According to Damodar Gujarati and Lewis Dars 
(1972), production workers are the workers assigned in processing, assembling, packing tasks 
whereas non-production workers are assigned to the activities as sales, engineers, legal,                               
and qualified technicians. 
In order to determine the relative wages and the relative employment gap among workers in 
the US manufacturing industries, we used the same method as Feenstra and Hanson (2003). 
To make it, we calculated the differential relative wages and relative employment gap 
between t and t-1 at time t: we set up the following ratios: 
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Δlog Wit =              
                                  
                         
      
                                    
                            
  
Δlog Nit =              
                              
                    
        
                               
                       
 
Δlog Wit/Nit = 
     
                                 
                         
       
                                
                           
 
      
                             
                    
        
                              
                       
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 Moreover to determine the quantitative effect we used Total employmentit which designs all 
workers both skilled and unskilled in the industry i. The data are available on Nber 
productivity. However, the total employment variable was to be turned in the first difference 
with the formula as follows: 
 
Δlog total employment = log total employmentit -  log total employmentit _1 
 
Finally, to determine the qualitative effect the variable was constructed as follows: 
 
Δlog (non-production workers/employment =      
                          
                   
      
                              
                    
  
 
 
2.3.2. The explanatory variable of interest 
In order to determine the effect of the globalization to both the relative wages and the relative 
employment between 1958- 2005 period, we used a proxy. Indeed, the globalization has been 
simplified on the form of outsourcing strategies. As we could see it above, outsourcing means 
the international divisions of value chains i.e. Intermediate goods are imported to produce a 
final good. 
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Regarding the construction of the proxy outsourcing, the methodology used is the same as 
Feenstra and Hanson’s (2003).Indeed, Outsourcing is measured both with the share of 
imported intermediate goods from abroad and with the share of imported intermediate goods 
from other sectors. To construct this measure, we used the output-input tables (IO US tables) 
for different industries in the U.S. Thanks to the input output tables, we have been able to 
calculate the share of imported intermediate goods from abroad (broad outsourcing), and data 
comes from Nber productivity. We combined this data with the data of the amount 
intermediate goods purchased from other sectors (census of manufactures). It enabled us to 
calculate the share of imported intermediate goods from inside 2-digit industry (narrow 
outsourcing). The combination of those data gave us a proxy for outsourcing. The 
construction of the proxy is the following: 
Outsourcingit proxy = broad outsourcingit - narrow outsourcingit 
 
2.3.3. Control variables 
We decided to control the regression for the openness-rate of each US industry. To make it, 
we used the standard formula of the openness-rate: (exportit + importit)/value addedit, where 
exportit and importit represent the export and import in million dollars in industry i at the time 
t and value addedit represents the real value added in million dollars in industry i at the time t. 
Moreover, the regression is controlled for the technological change growth rate, capital 
expenditure, the cost of materials and the tariffs in each industry i at time t. According to 
annual survey of manufactures, the cost of materials designs the direct charges actually paid 
or payable for goods consumed or put into production during the year, including the transport 
cost as well, whether these goods were purchased by some industries to other industries. The 
regression is also controlled for the production “value added” expressed in millions dollars 
The last control variable is high technology capital share. Berndt and Morrison (1995) define 
high technology share as communications equipment, engineering instruments, office 
equipment and computers. 
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Regarding the construction of this variable. The methodology used is the same as Feenstra 
and Hanson’s (2003), Berndt and Morrison’s (1995) .To make it, we calculated the share of 
this equipment which is in million dollars in total value of  capital for industry i at the time t. 
2.3.4 Candidate variables to be used as instruments 
We have endogeneity when the explanatory variables are not exogenous but correlated with 
the error term i.e. cov(Xi, εi) ≠0. In general we have three kinds of endogeneity: Error 
Measurement, inverse causality, Omitted variables. Our equations don’t have any reverse 
causality problems or measurement error problems but we suspected a problem about omitted 
variables. 
In order to purge the endogeneity of the outsourcing variable we decided to use the method of 
instrumental variables. The interest in using the method of instrumental variables allows in 
one hand to purge the variable of endogeneity and in the other hand confirms the sign and the 
significance of the variable outsourcing. 
We selected four candidate variables to be used as instruments. Two are derived from 
Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996) model assumptions: cost of unskilled labor and capital 
intensity. In order to build the variables cost of unskilled labor and capital intensity, we used 
the standard formula for each of the two variables. 
Cost of unskilled laborit = Wit*Lit, where wit represents the wage of production workers in the 
industry i at time t and Lit represents the number of production workers in the industry i at 
time t. 
Capital intensiveit= capitalit / value addedit, where capitalit represents the value in million 
dollars of machinery used in the industry i at time t. 
The variable productivity of production workers is derived from one Grossman and                             
Rossi-Hansberg’s (2008) model results as regards the productivity effect. The variable 
productivity of production workers was built the following way: 
Productivity of production workersit= value addedit/ production workersit,                                   
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Where value addedit represents the real value added in industry i at the time t and production 
workersit represents the number of production workers in the industry i at time t. 
The last candidate variable is the energy cost; we didn’t need to build that variable as long it 
is already available on Nber productivity. According to Nber productivity, the energy cost 
means the electricity and fuel consumption within the US manufacturing. Indeed, in order to 
produce manufactured goods, capital and labor are used as well as energy. For example in 
2002, US energy information administration showed that chemical industries used 29% of 
total energy in manufactured sector, as for the rest it was consumed by the other industries 
(see graph below). A second graph presented in the appendix shows that machine electricity 
consumption in textile industry reaches 25% of total energy. Thereby, outsourcing can be a 
way of reducing energy costs. 
  
 
Total energy consumed in U.S manufacturing,(2002) 
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2.3.5. Data  
In order to implement our empirical strategy described above, we built a panel database.                    
We have chosen as benchmark the United-states, the database contains a sample of 459 
manufacturing industries.  
Our paper focuses in the period from 1958 until 2005. The choice of this period is deliberate 
because it enables us to analyze the effects of globalization in the long-run. 
The construction of our database come from different sources, Nber productivity (Bartelsman, 
Becker, Gray) for 4-digit manufacturing industries information about annual industry-level 
data on output, non-production workers wages, payroll, total employment, non-production 
workers and other input costs, material cost, investment, capital stocks, total factor 
productivity growth rate and energy cost.  
However the data regarding production workers wages and production workers employment 
were not previously provided by Nber productivity. In order to determine them we made the 
difference between the wages paid to all workers (payroll) and the wages paid to non- 
production workers. We used the same method to get production workers employment, that is 
to say: total employment minus the non-production workers. 
Regarding the data for the construction of the outsourcing variable, the output-input tables     
(IO US tables) for the different manufacturing industries come from the Bureau of economic 
analysis.   
Moreover, regarding the data about exports, imports and the tariffs for different industries 
come from Cepii.  
Finally, the data for the construction of the technology share variable such as the 
communications equipment, engineering instruments, office equipment and computers within 
the US manufacturing industries come from the BLS (Bureau Labor of statistics).   
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III. Results of the empirical investigation of the outsourcing about 
the relative wage and the relative employment gap and the change 
in structure of the employment. 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table A summarizes characteristics of the manufacturing industries for the 1958-2005 period. 
The average number of workers in the manufacturing industries is 37610 which represents an 
increase of 15% for the whole period. The numbers of skilled workers increased by 5.35 % 
while the number of unskilled workers increased by only 0.34%.  
In terms of inequalities of wages and employment, the ratio of the relative wages gap of 
skilled workers represents as an average 1.53 which means that the relative wages gap among 
workers is of 53%. The wages gap increased by 6.01%. The relative employment gap of 
skilled workers is of 40.1% which represents an increase of 14.67%.  
As concerns the outsourcing strategies of firms, the average is 38% which is an increase of 
16.98% for the whole period. Moreover the openness-rate represents on average 19.2%. The 
growth rate of openness-rate is of 5.93 %. In terms of technological change, the average 
growth rate of industries is of 4.3% for the whole period. Moreover, the total capital 
expenditure represents 151.96 million dollars which is an increase of 12.02%. In terms of 
production, the value added regarding the manufacturing industries is of 2070.32 million 
dollars, an increase of 4.84 %. Moreover, the high technology share represents 22.8% in the 
total capital expenditure, an increase of 11.1 %. 
In terms of energy costs within industries, on average the energy costs amount to 89.66 
million dollars, an increase of 6.01%. The Cost of unskilled labor amounts to 37201.93 
million dollars, an increase of 26 %. The unskilled workers’ productivity is of 87.13 million 
dollars, an increase of 1.01%. Finally, on average the capital intensive represents for the 
industries 81 %, an increase of  3.54%. 
 
The descriptive statistics show that the industries are intensive-capital and intensive skilled 
labor. Moreover, we can observe that the inequalities in terms of jobs or wages have risen 
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sharply. Similarly, the outsourcing activities also increased sharply. Thus, on the one hand we 
can observe a growth of inequalities between skilled workers and unskilled workers, on the 
other hand we notice an increase of the outsourcing strategies. The legitimate question to be 
asked is: is there any correlation between both phenomena? 
Table b presents the correlation
5
 matrix between our outsourcing variable and the dependent 
variables and our instrumental variables. We can see that our outsourcing variable is 
positively and significantly at 1% level related with each of our dependent variables except 
for the total inequalities variable where the relation is negative and significant at 5% level. 
Moreover, the correlation between the outsourcing variable and the instruments is positive 
and significant at 1% level except for the unskilled workers ‘productivity variable where the 
relation is negative and significant at 5% level.  
In the following section, we present the main empirical results of the effect of outsourcing on 
relative wages and relative employment as well as the results of the effect of outsourcing on 
total employment and the non-production workers share within the US manufacturing 
industries. 
 
3.2 Outsourcing and relative wages of non-production workers in the manufacturing 
industries: 1958- 2005 
Table 1 reports the results regarding the effects of the outsourcing on relative wages of non-
production workers over the period 1958-2005. The estimation includes both industry fixed 
effects and time fixed effects. All variables are expressed in logarithms, this allows an 
interpretation of the results in terms of elasticity. All regressions have corrected the 
heteroskedasticity problem. Columns (1) to column (3) present the results of the estimate 
without instrumental variables.  
In column (1), the estimate for outsourcing is 0.005 and is 0.004 for the openness-rate. The 
coefficient of outsourcing is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, the coefficient of 
the openness-rate is positive but not statistically significant.  
 
 
 
5
The correlations between the outsourcing variable and the dependent variables are plotted in the appendix 
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In economic terms, the coefficient of outsourcing can be interpreted as follows: Everything 
else equal, if outsourcing increases by 1 percentage point, the wages gap among workers will 
increase by 0.005 percentage point. 
In the column (2), the regression is controlled by the technological change which is positive 
and highly significant, the technology share which is positive but not significant, the value 
added which is positive and significant at 1% level and the tariffs which is negative and 
statistically different to zero. Notice that the outsourcing variable is always positive and 
significant at 1% level.  
In the column (3), two other control variables were added, the material cost variable which is 
positive and significant at 1% level and the total capital expenditure which is also positive and 
significant at 1% level. The coefficient of outsourcing remains positive and significant at 1% 
level.  
In the column (4) and (5), we used the instrumental variable method. The interest is to purge 
the outsourcing variable of endogeneity related to omitted variables problem. The candidate 
variables to be used as instruments are the capital intensive, labor cost of production workers, 
production workers’ productivity and the energy cost. In order to prove the validity of our 
instruments, for each column we present the Hansen test, the Weak identification test and the 
underidentification test.  
In the column (4), the estimate for outsourcing is 0.010 and is highly statistically significant. 
The openness-rate variable is positive and is weakly significant. The technological change is 
positive and significant at 1% level. The technology share is always not significant. The 
estimation includes only industry fixed effects. Moreover, the result of Hansen test
6 
is 0.43 
and the result of weak identification
7 
is 2400 and the result of underidentification is 
significant at 1% level. The result of the tests shows that our instruments are relevant. 
Moreover, the results of the first-stage
8
 show a significant correlation between outsourcing 
and the instruments. Indeed, the correlation between the outsourcing and the energy cost is 
positive and significant at 5% level, the correlation between the outsourcing and the capital 
intensive is positive and significant at 5% level, the correlation between the outsourcing and 
6 
Under the null hypothesis, the instruments are not correlated with the error term.                                                                                               
7
The
 
instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but only weakly.                                                                                       
8 
The first stage 1 is presented in the appendix. 
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labor cost of production workers is positive and significant at 5% level. Finally, the 
correlation between the outsourcing and production workers’ productivity is negative and 
significant at 1% level. 
In the column (5), all the control variables were added, the outsourcing variable is positive 
and highly statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient increased slightly is equal 
to 0.011. The openness- rate has become not significant. The technological change is positive 
and significant at 1% level. “The tariffs” is not significant as well as the technology share. 
Table 1 confirms the outsourcing strategies of the manufacturing industries over the period 
1958-2005 increased the wages gap between skilled and unskilled workers. However, we can 
notice that the technological change played a role in widening wage inequalities. The 
technological change benefits to skilled workers. 
 
3.3 Outsourcing and relative employment of non-production workers in the manufacturing 
industries: 1958- 2005 
Table 2 focus on the effects of the outsourcing on the relative employment of non-production 
workers over the period 1958-2005. As previously, the estimation includes both industry fixed 
effects and time fixed effects. Columns (1) to column (3) present the results of the estimate 
without instrumental variables. 
Indeed, column (1) to column (3) show that the outsourcing is positively associated with the 
relative employment of non-production workers. The control variables are positive and 
significant, the only non-significant variables are the technology share, the tariffs and the 
materiel cost. We can notice that the magnitude of the coefficient regarding the outsourcing is 
higher for the employment gap than for the wages gap. Thus, outsourcing affects harder 
employment compared to wages.   
In the column (4) and (5), we used the instrumental variable method. The results confirm that 
the outsourcing impacts positively the employment share of skilled workers. The 
technological change still benefits to skilled workers. Moreover, the endogeneity tests show 
that our instruments are still relevant. 
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3.3 Outsourcing and total inequalities in the manufacturing industries: 1958- 2005 
Table 3 reports the regression results regarding the total effect of the outsourcing on the 
relative wages and the relative employment. As previously, the estimation includes both 
industry fixed effects and time fixed effects. Columns (1) to column (3) present the results of 
the estimate without instrumental variables. 
The main result of table 3 is the negative sign and significant at 1% level of the outsourcing 
variable. We find some evidence that suggests that the outsourcing separately increases wages 
and employment inequalities but not simultaneously. Thus, outsourcing strategies have a 
partial effect on inequalities. Indeed, the results show that the outsourcing reduced the total 
inequalities between skilled workers and unskilled workers over the period 1958-2005. The 
fall of total inequalities can have two feasible explanations: either it reflects a productivity 
effect
9 or it reflects an artificial fall as long outsourcing doesn’t affect wages and employment 
the same way. 
If the results obtained on table 1 and tables 2 confirm the standard literature about the 
responsibility of Globalization in widening wage inequalities and employment, table 3 
provides an alternative vision of globalization. In the section that follows, we present the main 
results about the change in structure of the employment as result of the outsourcing. 
 
3.4 Outsourcing and quantitative effect within the manufacturing industries: 1958- 2005 
Table 4 presents the results of our estimation for the quantitative effect within the 
manufacturing industries over the period 1958-2005. The estimation includes both industry 
fixed effects and time fixed effects. Columns (1) to column (3) present the results of the 
estimate without instrumental variables. Furthermore, the total capital expenditure and 
material cost variables were replaced by wages gap and employment gap. Moreover these two 
new variables were not regressed in the same time as the outsourcing variable because of 
some correlation between them. Finally, column (4) to column (5), energy costs and 
production workers’ productivity are the only instruments that remain valid. 
9 
The productivity effect has not been demonstrated in this paper. The Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg model 
(2008) show that through offshoring, firms become more efficient this is equivalent to an improvement of the 
labor productivity of unskilled workers. Demand for low skilled workers rises and pushes wages-up. 
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Column (1) shows that the outsourcing is positively correlated with the total employment. The 
openness-rate is not statistically different to zero. The technology share is not significant and 
the value added is positive and significant at 1% level. The technological change is positive 
and highly statistically significant. The technological change contributed to increase the total 
employment over the period 1958-2005. 
 
Column (2) shows that the wages gap variable is negatively and significantly correlated with 
the total employment. Everything else equal, if the wages gap increases by 1 percentage point, 
the total employment will decrease by 0.097 percentage point over the period 1958-2005. The 
employment gap variable is positive and significant at 1% level. Everything else equal, if the 
employment gap increases by 1 percentage point, the total employment will increase by 0.033 
percentage point over the period 1958-2005. 
 
Column (3) confirms that the outsourcing increased the total employment over the period 
1958-2005. The tariffs and technology share variables are not significant. The technological 
change is always positive and significant.  
 
In Column (4) and (5) we used the instrumental variables method, the outsourcing variable is 
positive and significant at 5% level. Everything else equal, if outsourcing increases by 1 
percentage point, the total employment will increase by 0.040 percentage point over the 
period 1958-2005. We can observe that the magnitude of the coefficient is lower compared to 
column (3).The technological change is positive and significant at 5% level, the technological 
share is still not significant. The value added is positive and significant at 1% level and the 
tariffs variable is negative and significant at 5% level. The result of Hansen test
6 
is 0.14 and 
the result of weak identification
 
is 2771.83 and the result of underidentification is significant 
at 1% level. The result of the tests
10
 shows that our instruments remain relevant.  
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
10 
The first- stage 2 is presented in the appendix. 
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3.4 Outsourcing and qualitative effect within the manufacturing industries: 1958- 2005 
Table 5a provides the estimate results for the qualitative effect during the period 1958-2005. 
We found that outsourcing strategies increased the non-production workers share within the                                    
manufacturing industries. The technological change also contributed to increase the non-
production workers share. We can notice the tariffs variable is negative but weakly 
statistically significant. 
However, in column (4), the tariffs variable is significant at 5% level but the magnitude of the 
coefficient is lower compared to column (3). In column (2), the wages gap and employment 
gap variables are positive and both significant at 1% level and 5% level. We can observe that 
the magnitude of the coefficient regarding the employment gap is higher compared to wages 
gap coefficient. Moreover we can make the same observation as regards outsourcing. Indeed, 
with the instrumental variables, the magnitude of the coefficient is higher compared to 
column (3).Everything else equal, if outsourcing increases by 1 percentage point, the non-
production workers share will increase by 0.033 percentage point within the manufacturing 
industries for the period 1958-2005. 
 
3.5 Outsourcing and production workers share in the manufacturing industries: 1958-2005 
In part 3.4 and part 3.5, total employment was decomposed into two distinct parts:  on the one 
hand we have non-production workers share in total employment and on the other hand we 
have production workers share in total employment. 
 
Thus, table 5b shows that outsourcing strategies decreased the production workers share 
within the US manufacturing industries during the period 1958-2005. Everything else equal, if 
outsourcing increases by 1 percentage point, the production workers share will decrease by 
0.023 percentage point. Without instrumental variables, everything else equal, the production 
workers share will decrease by 0.008 percentage point. Only employment gap variable 
increased production workers share in total employment. The results found are consistent with 
the stylized facts described in the literature. 
It is clear that outsourcing strategies have changed the structure of employment within the 
manufacturing industries on the period 1958-2005. We can notice that quantitative effect 
finds its explanation from qualitative effect. In section that follows, we performed a 
robustness check and a stability test in order to prove that the increase or decrease of wage 
gap and employment gap have followed the progress of outsourcing strategies. 
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Robustness Checks and Stability Test 
 
Stylized facts that are presented in the introduction show a growth of wage and employment 
gap in the US from the mid 1980’s. 
Our robustness checks consists in estimating outsourcing effect on wage and employment gap 
for two sub-periods: 1958-1983 and 1983-2005. By our descriptive statistics, outsourcing 
strategies between 1958 and 1983 increased by 8.27% whereas during the 1983- 2005 period 
outsourcing strategies increased by 21.92%. Thereby, we expect outsourcing effect to have a 
lower impact on the sub-period 1958-1983 compared to the sub-period 1983-2005. In 
addition, we performed a stability test
10
 (Chow test) in order to show the outsourcing, wage, 
employment relationship in not stable over time. 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the outsourcing effect on relative wages of non-production 
workers for two sub-periods: 1958-1983 and 1983-2005. The estimation includes both 
industry fixed effects and the instrumental variables. Our instrumental variables are the 
capital intensive, labor cost of production workers, production workers’ productivity and the 
energy cost In order to prove the validity of our instruments, for each column we present the 
Hansen test, the Weak identification test and the underidentification test. All regressions have 
corrected the heteroskedasticity problem. 
 
Column (1) shows the estimate for outsourcing is 0.008 and weakly significant. The 
openness-rate, the technological change and the technology share variables are not significant. 
Moreover, the result of Hansen test
6 
is 0.25 and the result of weak identification
7 
is 6133.58 
and the result of underidentification is significant at 1% level. The result of the tests shows 
that our instruments are relevant. 
 
In Column (2), the estimate for outsourcing is 0.007 but always weakly significant. The 
openness-rate, the technological change, the technology share and the tariffs variables are not 
significant. The only significant variables are the value added, material cost and capital 
expenditure.  
 
10 Chow test is used to test the stability of the coefficients on two different subsets. Under the null hypothesis, the relation               
estimated is stable. 
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Moreover, when the control variables are added the magnitude of outsourcing coefficient 
decreased.The result of Hansen test
6 
is 0.12 and the result of weak identification
7 
is 6114.85 
and the result of underidentification is significant at 1% level. The results regarding the 
validity of our instruments are positive.Thus, for the period 1958-1983, the impact of 
outsourcing on wage gap is low. 
In Column (3) the estimate for outsourcing is 0.008 and significant at 5% level. Note that the 
significance of the outsourcing variable is already higher than previously. The technological 
change variable is positive and significant at 5% level. The technology share variable is not 
significant. The tests regarding the validity of our instruments are still positive. 
 
In column (4) the estimate for outsourcing is 0.010 and highly significant. The technological 
change is positive and significant at 1 % level. The value added variable is positive and 
significant at 5% level. The material cost and capital expenditure variables are positive and 
highly significant. The tests regarding the validity of our instruments are positive. For the 
period 1983-2005, outsourcing strategies and technological change enable to explain the wage 
gap between skilled and unskilled workers. The result regarding the chow test is significant at 
1% level, it means that relation estimated is not stable for the whole period. 
 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the outsourcing effect on relative employment of non-production 
workers for two sub-periods: 1958-1983 and 1983-2005. The main result is an impact lower 
of the outsourcing both in terms of magnitude and significance for the sub-period 1958-1983. 
The chow test result is significant at 1% level. The relation estimated is not stable for the 
whole period. 
 
 
Table 8 reports the results of the outsourcing total effect on relative wage and relative 
employment gap for two sub-periods: 1958-1983 and 1983-2005. The main result is an impact 
lower both in terms of magnitude and significance of the outsourcing regarding the decrease 
of total inequalities among workers for the sub-period 1958-1983. The result regarding the 
chow test is significant at 1% level 
 
35 
 
Table 9 summarizes the main results regarding of the outsourcing effect on total employment 
within the US manufacturing industries for the sub-periods 1958-1983; 1983-2005. The 
estimation includes industry fixed effects Moreover, energy cost and production workers’ 
productivity are the only instruments that remain valid. 
For the period 1958-2005 the outsourcing variable has a lower significance as well as the 
value added and the technological change have. Moreover, the chow test shows that the 
relation estimated is not stable for the whole period. 
 
Table 10 reports the main results regarding the outsourcing effect on the non-production 
workers share. We can see a difference of both significance and magnitude as regards the 
variable outsourcing for the sub-periods 1958-1983; 1983-2005.Moreover, our instruments 
are relevant and the chow test is significant. Thus, over the period 1958-1983, the outsourcing 
strategies have had small effect on the non-production share within the US manufacturing 
industries. 
 
The results of the robustness check show on one hand that the increase or the decrease of 
wage and employment gap follow outsourcing strategies progress (we obtain a decrease of the 
total inequalities when wage and employment gap are simultaneously regressed); on the other 
hand, the robustness check show that the main results obtained on the previous parts are not 
sensible to the sub-period 1983-2005 (as long as outsourcing is relatively high during that 
period). Moreover, the chow test performed shows that the relationship between outsourcing, 
wages and employment gap moved erratically during the 1958-2005 period.  
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IV Conclusion 
Our empirical research enabled us to evidence that wage and employment inequalities within 
the U.S manufacturing industries between 1958 and 2005 were partly increased by trading 
tasks. Indeed, we could see that if the wage and employment gaps were separately increased 
by outsourcing, total inequalities between workers tended to decrease. 
Moreover, outsourcing has changed the structure of employment within the US. 
Manufacturing industries over the period 1958-2005. Indeed, two distinct effects could be 
observed: a quantitative and a qualitative effect. 
Outsourcing strategies enable to extract the features of manufacturing industries that use 
them. Those industries are capital intensive and consist of high costs regarding energy or 
lower skilled labor.  
Thus, because of the relocation of intensive tasks regarding unskilled labor, production 
techniques in manufacturing industries became more intensive as regards skilled labor. 
Indeed, the share of skilled workers in total employment has increased by 5.35% over the 
period 1958-2005. That observation was carried out by Trefler(1993) and outlines that the US 
have one of the highest productivity in the world. Thereby the US export skill intensive 
goods. 
Moreover, we have seen that in theory the firms have become more efficient due to the 
relocation of intensive tasks of unskilled labor (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)). In 
perfect competition, cost savings benefitted to the employed factor and therefore it is 
equivalent to an increase of the productivity of unskilled workers, which is known as a 
productivity effect. This productivity effect can have two possible effects: downward prices 
which give an advantage to consumers or a relative increase in the demand for unskilled 
workers. 
 
Finally, if outsourcing enables to increase production and enables to decrease costs, it may be 
considered as a way of exchanging production factors, especially scarce factors. According to 
the HOV (Hecksher-Ohlin Vanek) model, goods exchange is a substitute to factors exchange. 
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Moreover, while globalization seems responsible for the rise of employment and wage 
inequalities among workers, we shouldn’t forget that other factors are the cause of qualified 
jobs. We must take into account that there is a biased technological progress in favor of 
skilled workers because of trade openness. Indeed, technological change led to low-qualified 
jobs destruction but created more qualified jobs.      . 
Our results show that technological change has increased the wages differential between 
skilled and unskilled workers by 0.007 percentage point and by 0.042 percentage point 
employment gap.  
Thoenig and Verdier (2003) explain this phenomenon. In fact, globalization intensifies 
competition, firms react against foreign producers with lower costs, innovating and increasing 
their employment of skilled workers (defensive innovations). The test is focused towards the 
French industrial firms. Thus, sectors that have increased their degree of openness to trade 
have thereby increased the skilled Job / unskilled job ratio.  
 
Moreover, if the north-south trade increased the inequalities in the northern countries, we can 
observe that it is the same in the south because of a change in the specialization.  
Zhu and Trefler (2005), proposed an empirical study of this phenomenon. They studied the 
relationship between the intensity of skilled labor exports of developing countries and wage 
inequalities. They have used data for 20 developing countries between 1983 and 1997. For 
each sector (4-digit SITC), they used U.S. data to calculate skilled labor / unskilled in 
production ratio. They classified the sectors depending on their intensity in skilled labor.                      
They calculated the share of each good regarding the exports of the country towards                    
the OECD Xit (z), and cumulative Σ0ZXit (z) shares in 1990 and 1993. 
Thai exports to the OECD have become more intensive in skilled labor whereas Sri Lanka's 
exports to the OECD became less intensive in skilled labor. (Figure 10) 
 
 
Despite our being able to discuss the reason why globalization creates winners and losers in 
the first part of this paper, whatever it may be that relationship is still ambiguous. 
Within the field of political economy, the only legitimate question is: shall we continue to 
liberalize the labor market? Or on the contrary, shall we protect the workers being affected by 
globalization thanks to trade barriers (tariffs, quota...)? In addition, the redistribution is one 
more legitimate question: shall we tax globalization winners so to compensate losers? 
Therefore, it would be interesting in the future research to study these questions. 
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Tables and Figures 
                                                                                                                                                       
Table A                                                    Descriptive statistics 
                                                                                              1958-2005 
US  Manufacturing sector                  Mean         st. dev           min           max          differences %      observations 
Dependent variables 
Total employment 1000s                       37610          52.24        400         565400             6.38                  21955 
Non Production workers 1000s             27220          38.12        300         464500             5.35                  21955 
Production workers 1000s                    10390           18.48        100         294200             0.34                  21955 
Non-production workers wages $1m     670.34         1310.83     3.75         21558                4.10                    21955 
Production workers wages $1m             418.35         829.85        3.46         16352              - 4.70                    21955 
Wages gap among workers ratio            1.53             0.553        0.66         3.67                6.01                   21955 
Employment gap among workers %       40.1             35          - 0.94         635                14.67                  21955 
Interest variable 
Outsourcing %                                             38                 60                1.34           67                  16.98                    21743 
Control variables 
Openness rate %                                        19.2                 4                10.5           26.1                 5.93                   21955 
  TFP                                                      4.3               6.02           0.36          6.41                  -                    21955 
Tariffs  %                                                  8                22.75          2.15        24.38              4.74                  21955 
Total capital expenditure in $1m         151.96          457.46           0         14583.6            12.02                 21955 
Cost of materials in $1m                    2413.76        8352.63         7        345883.1             4.72                 21955 
Value added $1m                                    2070.32        4638.99        10.2     104711.5            4.84                 21955 
High technology share                           22.8                36              1.32          52                 11.1                 21535 
Candidate Instruments 
Energy costs   $1m                                   89.66            329.09           0.1         11246.1        6.01                21955 
Cost of unskilled labor $1m                      37201.93       224794.5      1.95        6709473        26                  21955 
Cost of skilled labor $1m                           12531.26      77853.44    - 0.38        2267802       20.44              21955 
Production workers’ productivity $          87.13           128.80          3.20        3949.018       1.01               2 1955 
42 
 
Non-production workers’ productivity $   229.535      294.757    - 691        10282.97          5.30                 21955     
K/Y (capital intensive)                               0.81             0.69         0.034           0.67              3.54                 21955     
Notes: the variables “non-production workers’ productivity” and “Cost of unskilled labor” were not used as 
instrument. They are used as a comparative tool.  Outsourcing increased by 8.27% between 1958-1983 and by 
21.92 % between 1983-2005. See section 2 for definition of all variables                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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Table b correlation matrix 
                         Δlog Outsourcing Δlog wages gap Δlog employment gap Δlog total inequalities Δlog total employment                                                                     
                                                      
Δlog Outsourcing                 1.000 
Δlog relative Wages             0.0294***           1.0000 
Δlog relative employment    0.0866***           0.0048                  1.0000 
Δlog Total inequalities       - 0.0440**             0.0185                  0.0184                   1.0000 
Δlog Total employment        0.0265***           0.0936***         - 0.0181***           - 0.9722***                   1.0000 
Δlog skilled workers share    0.0499***          0.0143***           0.3455***              0.0259**                    - 0.0124*    
Δlog   Labor cost -                 0.6979***        - 0.0041                0.0027                  - 0.0412                          0.0217 
unskilled workers 
Δlog Energy cost                   0.0278***            0.0022                - 0.0025                - 0.0008                        - 0.0014   
Δlog Capital intensive           0.0289***            0.0032                - 0.0008                - 0.0041                        - 0.0011   
Δlog unskilled workers’      - 0.0238**            - 0.0069                0.0015                  - 0.0086                        - 0.0094                       
productivity 
                            Δ log skilled workers share  Δ log Labor cost unskilled workers  Δ log energy cost  Δ log  Capital  intensive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
Δlog Outsourcing 
Δlog  relative wage      
Δlog relative employment  
Δlog Total inequalities 
Δlog Total employment 
Δlog skilled workers share     1.0000   
Δlog Labor cost -                    0.0529***                       1.0000 
 unskilled workers 
Δlog Energy cost                 - 0.0023                             - 0.012                                         1.000 
Δlog Capital intensive         - 0.4262***                       - 0.0246                                       0.0016                            1.000 
Δlog unskilled workers’      - 0.0112                             - 0.0057                                     - 0.0069                            0.0013                                                                                                                 
productivity 
                                                                                                                                             Δlog unskilled workers’ productivity 
                                                                                                                                                                                              1.000 
Note : *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (relative wages of  non-production workers): 1958-2005             
                                                 
                                                        within               within                 within                              IV2LS                         IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                       (1)                     (2)                      (3)                                    (4)                               (5) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                         0.005***           0.009***             0.008***                         0.010***                     0.011*** 
                                                      (0.002)               (0.002)                (0.002)                             (0.004)                        (0.004) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                      0.004                 0.012                   0.015                               0.019*                          0.014 
                                                      (0.008)              (0.010)                 (0.010)                            (0.011)                         (0.013) 
 
Δ TFP                                                                      0.003*                 0.004**                           0.006***                      0.007***                  
                                                                                (0.002)                 (0.001)                            (0.002)                         (0.003) 
 
Δ Log technology share                                          0.002                    0.001                               0 .009                            0.011 
                                                                               (0.003)                  (0.002)                            (0.010)                          (0.011) 
 
Δ Log Y                                                                  0.015***              0.017**                                                                0.014*** 
                                                                               (0.006)                  (0.008)                                                                (0.006) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                         - 0.001***             - 0.001***                                                           - 0.001 
                                                                               (0.002)                   (0.002)                                                                (0.002) 
 
Δ Log material cost                                                                              0.055***                                                             0.056*** 
                                                                                                             (0.006)                                                                (0.006) 
 
Δ Log Capital expenditure                                                                   0.038***                                                             0.040*** 
                                                                                                             (0.006)                                                                (0.005) 
                                                                                                              
Constant                                        - 0.017           - 0.076                    - 0.021                       
                                                       (0.015)           (0.031)                    (0.034)                                                                                                
  
Industry fixed effects                  yes                      yes                           yes                                   yes                                yes 
  
Time fixed effects                       yes                      yes                           yes                                    no                                 no 
 
 R2                                             0.04                     0.07                         0.08                                  0.033                            0.06 
 
Observations                              6321                   4016                        4016                                  2383                            2383 
 
Panel test:   Hausman test       0.0029               0.000                     0.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                     FE or RE 
 
IV tests:    Hansen J   (overidentification test of all instruments) P-val:                        0.43                               0.26 
                 Weak identification (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)                                  2400                         2366.76 
                 Underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) P-val:                     0.000                            0.000 
Notes. All regressions were estimated using a within estimator except for column 4 and 5 we used the 2SLS. The 
instruments are : capital intensive, labor cost of production workers, production workers’ productivity and the 
energy cost .All variables are expressed in logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  The sample used  in estimation consists of 459 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 
2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%.  
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Table 2: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (relative employment of non-production workers): 1958-2005             
                                                 
                                                    within                  within                   within                                IV2LS                     IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                   (1)                        (2)                        (3)                                      (4)                            (5) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                      0.053***            0.055***                0.053***                          0.051***                  0.048*** 
                                                   (0.009)                (0.012)                   (0.013)                             (0.011)                      (0.012)                         
 
Δ Log openness-rate                   0.085***            0.070*                    0.069*                           0.064*                    0.065* 
                                                   (0.028)                (0.037)                   (0.037)                              (0.039)                     (0.038)                                    
 
Δ TFP                                                                    0.006***               0.004***                           0.005***                   0.042***                  
                                                                              (0.002)                   (0.001)                              (0.002)                      (0.001)                                                   
 
Δ Log technology share                                         0.045                      0.044                                0.010                         0.007 
                                                                               (0.030)                   (0.030)                             (0.018)                      (0.019) 
 
Δ Log Y                                                                 0.078***                 0.071***                                                            0.045** 
                                                                               (0.021)                    (0.019)                                                               (0.022) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                         - 0.001                    - 0.001                                                                - 0.004 
                                                                               (0.007)                    (0.007)                                                               (0.006)                                                                                                                                                  
 
Δ Log material cost                                                                               0.007                                                                   0.013                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                              (0.020)                                                                (0.019)                                                 
 
Δ Log Capital expenditure                                                                    0.006***                                                             0.059*** 
                                                                                                              (0.018)                                                     (0.016) 
 
Constant                                    0.022                     - 0.116                 - 0.351**                                   
                                                 (0.078)                     (0.132)                 (0.162)                                                                                              
  
Industry fixed effects                yes                             yes                        yes                                     yes                         yes 
  
Time fixed effects                     yes                             yes                        yes                                      no                          no 
 
 R2                                            0.02                            0.03                      0.03                                    0.01                        0.02 
 
Observations                            6322                           3659                     3659                                   3728                       3714 
 
Panel test:   Hausman test        0.03                             0.01                      0.06 
                    FE or RE                   
 
IV tests:    Hansen J   (overidentification test of all instruments) P-val:                                0.37                     0.23 
                 Weak identification (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)                                       7924.55              5426.81 
                 Underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) P-val:                             0.000                   0.000 
Notes. All regressions were estimated using a within estimator except for column 4 and 5  we used the 2SLS. 
The instruments are : capital intensive, labor cost of production workers, production workers’ productivity and 
the energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation consists of 459 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 
2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 3: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (relative wages of  non- production workers/ relative employment of non-
production workers): 1958-2005                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                 
                                                   within                  within                 within                               IV2LS                         IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                  (1)                        (2)                      (3)                                     (4)                               (5) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                  - 0.025***            - 0.026***          - 0.019***                       - 0.042***                    - 0.036*** 
                                                 (0.008)                  (0.007)                (0.006)                            (0.013)                          (0.012) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                  0.069*                 0.058*                 0.055*                             0.077*                          0.090***                             
                                                  (0.037)                (0.031)                 (0.031)                            (0.042)                          (0.039)                   
 
Δ TFP                                        0.039                   0.045***             0.040***                         0.052***                      0.048*** 
                                                  (0.011)                (0.010)                 (0.009)                            (0.014)                         (0.013)                             
 
Δ Log technology share                                        0.010                    0.011                               0.018                            0.002 
                                                                              (0.010)                 (0.008)                            (0.020)                          (0.019) 
 
Δ Log Y                                                                0.041***              0.037***                         0.039***                       0.042*** 
                                                                             (0.008)                  (0.007)                            (0.009)                          (0.007) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                                                     - 0.002                                                                   - 0.002 
                                                                                                           (0.005)                                                                   (0.006)                                                     
 
Δ Log material cost                                                                            0.334***                                                               0.306***                                                                                                       
                                                                                                           (0.023)                                                                  (0.033) 
 
Δ Log Capital expenditure      0 .717***              0.615***              0.373***                         0.599***                       0.377*** 
                                               (0.008)                   (0.032)                  (0.021)                            (0.050)                           (0.033) 
 
Constant                                - 0,704                   - 0.940***            - 0.082***                                                             
                                               (0.179)                    (0.312)                  (0.278)                                                               
  
Industry fixed effects                yes                         yes                            yes                                 yes                               yes          
  
Time fixed effects                     yes                         yes                            yes                                  no                                no 
 
 R2                                           0.76                        0.81                             0.84                             0.78                              0.81 
 
Observations                           3314                       3251                            3251                            3246                             3246 
 
Panel test:   Hausman test       0.03                        0.00                             0.05 
                    FE or RE 
 
 
IV tests: Hansen J   (overidentification test of all instruments) P-val:                             0.48                           0.14 
              Weak identification (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)                                      2778.78                 2771.83 
              Underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) P-val:                          0.000                        0.000 
Notes. All regressions were estimated using a within estimator except for column 4 and 5 we used the 2SLS. The 
instruments are: capital intensive, labor cost of production workers, production workers’ productivity and the 
energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation consists of 459 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 
2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 4: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (Total employment): 1958-2005             
                                                 
                                                          within                 within                within                              IV2LS                    IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                         (1)                       (2)                      (3)                                   (4)                          (5) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                            0.040***                                        0.066***                        0.044***                0.040** 
                                                         (0.018)                                            (0.022)                           (0.018)                   (0.020) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                         0.056                  0.021                   0.020                              0.049                       0.048                                                                                 
                                                         (0.059)               (0.022)                 (0.022)                           (0.068)                     (0.066) 
 
Δ TFP                                               0.042***           0.040***               0.041***                       0.027***                 0.018**                                     
                                                         (0.053)              (0.005)                  (0.015)                           (0.008)                    (0.009)                                          
 
Δ Log technology share                   0.067                  0.014                    0.016                              0.014                       0.015 
                                                         (0.055)               (0.021)                 (0.022)                           (0.024)                     (0.024) 
 
Δ Log Y                                            0.022**             0.021**                 0.019***                                                       0.032*** 
                                                         (0.011)              (0.010)                   (0.009)                                                          (0.022) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                            - 0.056                   - 0.052                                                           - 0.021** 
                                                                                   (0.059)                  (0.054)                                                           (0.011)                                           
 
Δ Log relative wages gap                                        - 0.097***                                                                                    
                                                                                  (0.016)                                                                                         
 
Δ Log relative employment gap                                0.033***                                                                                     
                                                                                  (0.010)                                                                                                            
                                                                                                              
Constant                                            0.008             - 0.006***             - 0.038***                              
                                                         (0.113)             (0.019)                   (0.013)                                                                                                       
  
Industry fixed effects                        yes                         yes                      yes                                  yes                           yes  
  
Time fixed effects                             yes                         yes                      yes                                   no                            no 
 
 R2                                                 0.32                          0.92                       0.93                                0.513                     0.62  
 
Observations                                 2413                         2412                      2410                                3995                      3995 
 
Panel test:   Hausman test            0.012                         0.00                       0.01                                                                                                                                           
                     FE or RE 
 
IV tests:    Hansen J   (overidentification test of all instruments) P-val:                              0.13                        0.16 
                 Weak identification (  Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)                                      31.58                   23.184 
                 Underidentification  ( Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) P-val:                          0.000                     0.000 
Notes. All regressions were estimated using a within estimator except for column 4 and 5 we used the 2SLS. The 
instruments are:  production workers’ productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation consists of 459 
manufacturing  industries between 1958 and 2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 
1%. 
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Table 5a: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (Non-production workers share / total employment): 1958-2005             
                                                 
                                                        within                  within                within                              IV2LS                         IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                       (1)                        (2)                     (3)                                    (4)                               (5) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                           0.025***                                        0.027***                       0.040***                     0 .033*** 
                                                        (0.006)                                            (0.007)                          (0.007)                        (0.004) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                        0.025*                 0.041***            0.034***                       0.042***                     0.043*** 
                                                        (0.013)                (0.015)                (0.014)                          (0.016)                         (0.017) 
 
 Δ TFP                                             0.034***             0.029***            0.028***                       0.044***                     0.034*** 
                                                        (0.005)                 (0.007)               (0.006)                          (0.008)                        (0.009) 
 
Δ Log technology share                                                0.022                0.018                             0.026                           0.025 
                                                                                     (0.016)              (0.016)                          (0.017)                        (0.018) 
 
Δ Log Y                                                                        0.053***           0.051***                      0.068***                     0.056*** 
                                                                                     (0.014)               (0.010)                         (0.019)                         (0.016) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                               - 0.037*            - 0.034*                                                             - 0.015** 
                                                                                     (0.023)              (0.026)                                    (0.007) 
 
Δ Log relative wages gap                                             0.020***                                                                                             
                                                                                     (0.006)                                                                                                                                          
 
Δ Log relative employment gap                                   0.041**                                                                                          
                                                                                     (0.014)                                                                                                               
                                                                                                              
Constant                                             0.061***           0.059***             0.032*** 
                                                          (0.010)               (0.016)                (0.011)                                                
  
Industry fixed effects                          yes                        yes                    yes                                     yes                          yes  
  
Time fixed effects                                no                         no                      no                                      no                           no 
 
 R2                                                      0.03                      0.02                    0.06                                  0.78                         0.80  
 
Observations                                      4123                      2419                  2410                                 3996                        3994 
 
Panel test:   Hausman test                 0.02                      0.000                     0.000                                                                                                                                                         
                     FE or RE 
 
IV tests:    Hansen J   (overidentification test of all instruments) P-val:                              0.46                        0.41 
                 Weak identification (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)                                       20.37                      18.90                                        
                 Underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) P-val:                                                          0.000   
Notes. All regressions were estimated using a within estimator except for column 4 and 5 we used the 2SLS. The 
instruments are:  production workers’ productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation consists of 459 
manufacturing industries between 1958 and 2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 5b: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (production workers/ total employment): 1958-2005             
                                                 
                                                          within                          within                                                              IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                         (1)                                (2)                                                                    (5) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                        - 0.008***                                                                                             - 0.023*** 
                                                       (0.003)                                                                                                   (0.006) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                     - 0.006                            - 0.001                                                             - 0.007 
                                                       (0.009)                            (0.006)                                                            (0.016) 
 
Δ TFP                                           - 0.014***                      - 0.013                                                            - 0.019*** 
                                                      (0.006)                             (0.038)                                                            (0.007) 
 
Δ Log technology share               - 0.020*                           - 0.017*                                                          - 0.017 
                                                      (0.011)                             (0.009)                                                            (0.007) 
                                                          
Δ Log Y                                       - 0.016***                       - 0.016***                                                       - 0.016 
                                                      (0.003)                             (0.002)                                                             (0.004) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                   0.001                               0.000                                                               0.002 
                                                      (0.002)                             (0.001)                                                            (0.002) 
 
Δ Log relative wages gap                                                      0.047***                                                   
                                                                                              (0.011)                                                                          
 
Δ Log relative employment gap                                          - 0.075***                                                                        
                                                                                              (0.022)                                                                                           
                                                                                                              
Constant                                       - 0.087*                          - 0.012** 
                                                      (0.048)                            (0.005)                                                 
  
Industry fixed effects                        yes                                 yes                                                                  yes                        
  
Time fixed effects                             yes                                 yes                                                                   no  
 
 R2                                                     0.12                              0.14                                                                  0.46 
 
Observations                                    6094                               6553                                                                 6110 
 
Panel test:   Hausman test                 0.02                              0.000                                                                                          
                     FE or RE 
 
IV tests:    Hansen J   (overidentification test of all instruments) P-val:                                        0.55 
                 Weak identification (  Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)                                              1505.55 
                 Underidentification  ( Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) P-val:                                   0.000                    
Notes. All regressions were estimated using a within estimator except for column 4 and 5 we used the 2SLS. The 
instruments are:  production workers’ productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation consists of 459 
manufacturing  industries between 1958 and 2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 
1%. 
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Table 6: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (relative wages of  non-production workers)         
                                                                                                                           
                                        1958-1983:       IV2LS                    IV2LS           1983-2005   :     IV2LS                IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                                        (1)                          (2)                                               (3)                      (4) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                                          0.008*                   0.007*                                          0.008**             0.010*** 
                                                                       (0.005)                   (0.005)                                         (0.004)               (0.004) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                                       0.002                      0.003                                           0.006                 0.001 
                                                                       (0.002)                   (0.013)                                         (0.013)              (0.012) 
 
Δ TFP                                                             0.003                     0.002                                            0.005**             0.007*** 
                                                                      (0.003)                   (0.003)                                         (0.003)               (0.002) 
 
Δ Log technology share                                 0.002                      0.002                                          0.002                  0.004 
                                                                      (0.004)                    (0.004)                                       (0.007)                (0.007)          
 
Δ Log Y                                                                                         0.005***                                                               0.011** 
                                                                                                      (0 001)                                                                  (0.005)                 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                                                - 0.003                                                                    - 0.002 
                                                                                                      (0.003)                                                                   (0.003)         
 
Δ Log material cost                                                                       0.062***                                                                0.063***                                                                                           
                                                                                                      (0.010)                                                                   (0.007)         
 
Δ Log Capital expenditure                                                            0.005***                                                                0.011*** 
                                                                                                      (0.001)                                                                   (0.003) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                              
  
Industry fixed effects                                       yes                             yes                                          yes                         yes  
  
 
 R2                                                                 0.082                           0.94                                         0.92                      0.97 
 
Observations                                                  1895                           1895                                        2140                     2140                                                            
 
IV tests:    Hansen J                                 0.25                        0.12                                      0.38                0.21 
                 Weak identification                6133.58                  6114.85                              4514.77        4390.28 
                 Underidentification                 0.000                      0.000                                   0.000             0.000 
 
Chow test                                                                           0.000 
 
Notes. All regressions were estimated using the 2SLS estimator. The instruments are: capital intensive, labor cost 
of production workers, production workers’ productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in 
logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation 
consists of 459 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  
*** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 7: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (relative employment of  non-production workers)         
                                                                                                                           
                                           1958-1983:       IV2LS               IV2LS           1983-2005   :      IV2LS                  IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                                           (1)                     (2)                                                (3)                        (4) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                                             0.028*                0.027*                                         0.063***               0.060*** 
                                                                          (0.017)               (0.017)                                         (0.016)                   (0.015) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                                          0.087                  0.088                                           0.109**                0.108** 
                                                                          (0.058)               (0.058)                                         (0.057)                  (0.057) 
 
Δ TFP                                                                0.045**              0.044**                                       0.064***               0.056** 
                                                                          (0.020)               (0.021)                                         (0.017)                  (0.027) 
 
Δ Log technology share                                    0.004                  0.005                                            0.002                    0.004 
                                                                         (0.024)                (0.024)                                         (0.036)                 (0.035) 
 
Δ Log Y                                                                                        0.141**                                                                     0.156***                                      
                                                                                                     (0.063)                                                                       (0.067) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                                              - 0.014                                                                        - 0.002 
                                                                                                    (0.010)                                                                       (0.009) 
 
Δ Log material cost                                                                     0.016                                                                           0.018                                                                                       
                                                                                                    (0.031)                                                                        (0.029)                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Δ Log Capital expenditure                                                           0.038*                                                                        0.069*                       
                                                                                                    (0.022)                                                                        (0.026) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                              
  
Industry fixed effects                                       yes                         yes                                                 yes                       yes  
  
 
 R2                                                                0.89                         0.91                                                 0.94                      0.96 
 
Observations                                                1703                        1703                                                1818                      1818                  
 
IV tests:    Hansen J                        0.18                            0.55                                            0.64                   0.66 
                 Weak identification     3630.19                     3681.90                                        9561.90           9577.02 
                 Underidentification       0.000                         0.000                                           0.000                 0.000 
 
Chow test                                                                        0.000 
                           
Notes. All regressions were estimated using  the 2SLS estimator. The instruments are: capital intensive, labor 
cost of production workers, production workers’ productivity and the energy cost.  All variables are expressed in 
logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation 
consists of 459 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  
*** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 8: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (Total effect) 
                                                                                                                           
                                            1958-1983:       IV2LS                 IV2LS               1983-2005   :     IV2LS             IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                                            (1)                       (2)                                                  (3)                    (4) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                                           - 0.024*               - 0.017*                                          - 0.043**          - 0.032** 
                                                                          (0.016)                 (0.010)                                           (0.021)              (0.011) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                                          0.021                   0.018                                               0.0 32                0.031 
                                                                          (0.053)                 (0.037)                                            (0.077)             (0.045) 
 
Δ TFP                                                                0.084***              0.065***                                        0.057**            0.048*** 
                                                                          (0.010)                 (0.013)                                            (0.017)             (0.015) 
 
Δ Log technology share                                     0.034                   0.027                                              0.026                 0.020 
                                                                          (0.026)                  (0.014)                                           (0.011)              (0.018) 
 
Δ Log Y                                                                                         0.028***                                                                  0.055*** 
                                                                                                       (0.012)                                                                     (0.013) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                                                - 0.011*                                                                    - 0.007 
                                                                                                       (0.006)                                                                     (0.006) 
 
Δ Log material cost                                                                       0.022***                                                                   0.012***           
                                                                                                      (0.007)                                                                      (0.009) 
 
Δ Log Capital expenditure                                                             0.035***                                                                  0.051*** 
                                                                                                       (0.005)                                                                     (0.002) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                              
  
Industry fixed effects                                             yes                       yes                                                yes                     yes 
  
 
 R2                                                                         0.11                      0.85                                               0.38                    0.81 
 
Observations                                                          1541                    1541                                              1719                   1719                                 
 
IV tests:    Hansen J                                       0.24                    0.30                                         0.21                0.22 
                 Weak identification                      8143                   8160                                       8772.92        8255.65 
                 Underidentification                      0.000                  0.000                                       0.000             0.000 
 
Chow test                                                                           0.000 
 
Notes. All regressions were estimated using the 2SLS estimator. The instruments are: capital intensive, labor cost 
of production workers, production workers’ productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in 
logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation 
consists of   459  manufacturing industries between  1958 – 2003 and 1983-2005 . * Significance at the 10% 
level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 9: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (Total employment) 
                                                                                                                           
                                             1958-1983:               IV2LS                  1983-2005   :                    IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                                                     (1)                                                                     (2) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                                                        0.028*                                                              0.079*** 
                                                                                      (0.015)                                                             (0.015) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                                                     0.032                                                                0.060 
                                                                                     (0.036)                                                              (0.067) 
 
Δ TFP                                                                           0.029*                                                              0.052*** 
                                                                                     (0.017)                                                             (0.013) 
 
Δ Log technology share                                                0.023                                                               0.028 
                                                                                     (0.019)                                                             (0.035) 
 
Δ Log Y                                                                        0.043*                                                             0.065** 
                                                                                     (0.023)                                                             (0.031) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                               - 0.010*                                                           - 0.021* 
                                                                                     (0.005)                                                             (0.011) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Δ Log relative wages gap                                           
                                                                                 
 
Δ Log relative employment gap                                                                   
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                              
  
Industry fixed effects                                                     yes                                                                      yes 
  
 
 R2                                                                                0.53                                                                     0.5355 
 
Observations                                                                1161                                                                      1161                      
 
IV tests:    Hansen J                                             0.79                                                               0.19 
                 Weak identification                           24308                                                           23469 
                 Underidentification                            0.005                                                            0.000 
 
Chow test                                                                               0.001 
 
Notes. All regressions were estimated using the 2SLS estimator. The instruments are: production workers’ 
productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation consists of 459 manufacturing industries between 
1958 and 2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%. 
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Table 10: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (Non-production workers share / total employment):) 
                                                                                                                           
                                             1958-1983:               IV2LS                  1983-2005   :                    IV2LS 
Explanatory variables                                                    (1)                                                                      (2) 
 
 
Δ Log outsourcing                                                        0.011*                                                               0.019*** 
                                                                                     (0.007)                                                               (0.005) 
 
Δ Log openness-rate                                                     0.015                                                                 0.016* 
                                                                                     (0.010)                                                               (0.009) 
 
Δ TFP                                                                           0.019***                                                            0.026** 
                                                                                     (0.007)                                                               (0.013) 
                                                                                                                                                       
Δ Log technology share                                               0.036                                                                  0.027 
                                                                                     (0.075)                                                               (0.034) 
 
Δ Log Y                                                                       0.015**                                                               0.018*** 
                                                                                    (0.007)                                                                (0.005) 
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                              - 0.010                                                                - 0.024** 
                                                                                    (0.008)                                                                (0.011) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Δ Log relative wages gap                                          
                                                                                   
 
Δ Log relative employment gap                                     
                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                              
  
Industry fixed effects                                                    yes                                                                         yes 
  
 
 R2                                                                                0.5435                                                                 0.5457 
 
Observations                                                                  2139                                                                    2139                      
 
IV tests:    Hansen J                                               0.99                                                             0.18 
                 Weak identification                              4033                                                           24308 
                 Underidentification                              0.001                                                            0.000 
 
Chow test                                                                    0.001 
 
Notes. All regressions were estimated using the 2SLS estimator. The instruments are: production workers’ 
productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in estimation consists of 459 manufacturing industries between 
1958 - 1983 and between 1983-2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%. 
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Figure 1 
 
                       Source: Eurobarometer “Views on European Union enlargement” 2009 
                                                                     
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
          Source: Marios Michaelides and Peter R. Mueser, Monthly Labor Review, July 2012 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Source: US. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
Change in the specialization 
Source: Zhu and Trefler (2005) 
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Appendix 
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1: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (Outsourcing): 1958-2005             
                                                 
                                                                                         IV2LS (First stage)                      
Explanatory variables                                                                                    
 
 
                                                      
 
Δ Log openness-rate                                                           0.012 
                                                                                           (0.024) 
 
Δ TFP                                                                                 0.082*** 
                                                                                           (0.007)             
 
Δ Log technology share                                                     0.015                           
                                                                                           (0.019)                   
 
Δ Log Y                                                                              0.021                                                                   
                                                                                           (0.025)                                                                             
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                                      - 0.005                                                             
                                                                                            (0.004)                                                                        
 
Δ Log material cost                                                           - 0.019                                                                      
                                                                                            (0.012)                                                                         
 
Δ Log Capital expenditure                                                  0.008                                                                       
                                                                                            (0.012)  
 
 Δ energy cost                                                                     0.016** 
                                                                                           (0.008) 
 
 Δ capital intensive                                                     0.014** 
                                                                                            (0.007) 
 
Δ production workers’ productivity                         - 0.009*** 
                                                                                   (0.004) 
 
Δ labor cost of  production workers                              0.017** 
                                                                                            (0.007) 
  
Industry fixed effects                                                              yes                   
  
 
 R2                                                                                           0.44 
 
Observations                                                                           2283 
 
IV tests:    F test P-val:                                                                                 0.000 
                 Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments:    0.000                                                 
                           
Notes.  The instruments are: the capital intensive, labor cost of production workers, production workers’ 
productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used  in estimation consists of 459 manufacturing  industries between 
1958 and 2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%.  
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2: Dependent variable:  Δ Log (Outsourcing): 1958-2005             
                                                 
                                                                                    IV2LS (First stage)                      
Explanatory variables                                                                                    
 
 
                                                      
 
Δ Log openness-rate                                                          0.028 
                                                                                          (0.047) 
 
Δ TFP                                                                                0.082*** 
                                                                                          (0.007)             
 
Δ Log technology share                                                    0.015                           
                                                                                          (0.019)                   
 
Δ Log Y                                                                            0.016*                                                                   
                                                                                          (0.010)                                                                             
 
Δ Log tariffs                                                                    - 0.013*                                                             
                                                                                          (0.007)                                                                        
 
Δ Log wage gap                                                              - 0.025***                                                                      
                                                                                          (0.012)                                                                         
 
Δ Log employment gap                                                     0.013                                                                       
                                                                                          (0.012)  
 
 Δ energy cost                                                                    0.014*** 
                                                                                          (0.006) 
                                                                                             
Δ production workers’ productivity                       - 0.006*** 
                                                                                 (0.002) 
 
Industry fixed effects                                                             yes                   
  
 
 R2                                                                                           0.51 
 
Observations                                                                           2294 
 
IV tests:    F test P-val:                                                                                 0.000                              
                 Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments:    0.000                                                 
                           
Notes.  The instruments are: the capital intensive, labor cost of production workers, production workers’ 
productivity and the energy cost. All variables are expressed in logarithms. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  The sample used  in estimation consists of 459 manufacturing  industries between 
1958 and 2005. * Significance at the 10% level.  ** Idem, 5%.  *** Idem, 1%.  
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